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JURISDICTION AT WORK: SPECIFIC PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB
Anaid Reyes Kipp*
ABSTRACT
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (BMS), eighty-six
California residents and five hundred ninety-two nonresidents from
thirty-three different states, who had originally filed eight separate
complaints, used ordinary party joinder rules to file a mass tort action
in California state court, alleging that Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
blood-thinning drug made them sick. The Supreme Court held in 2017
that the California state court did not have specific personal
jurisdiction over the national pharmaceutical company because its
contacts with California were insufficient in relation to the claims by
nonresident plaintiffs. Although BMS was a mass action filed in state
court, its applicability to other forms of aggregate litigation was left
open by the Court. As a result, a growing split among the courts has
emerged regarding BMS’s effect on the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs
in collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). To
date, three United States Courts of Appeals have addressed the issue,
reaching disparate results, while disagreements among the district
courts cut across courts within the same judicial districts and circuits.
This divided landscape highlights the need for further guidance from
Congress and the Supreme Court to define the scope of specific
personal jurisdiction in collective actions. This Note argues that to
protect workers’ rights, promote uniformity and judicial efficiency
across the nation, deter forum shopping, and support federalism, the
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Supreme Court, Congress, or both should formulate a clear rule
granting district courts specific personal jurisdiction over employers
in FLSA collective actions with respect to the claims of nonresident
plaintiffs.
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INTRODUCTION
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (BMS), the Supreme
Court held that a California state court did not have specific personal
jurisdiction over a national pharmaceutical company in a mass tort
action because the company’s contacts with California were
insufficient regarding the claims by nonresident plaintiffs.1 Justice
Alito, writing for the majority, indicated that the Court merely engaged
in a “straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction.”2 Yet scholars soon noted that the BMS decision was not
simply applying unquestioned jurisdictional principles or clarifying a
“notoriously hazy doctrine”; in fact, BMS was part of a “stealth
revolution” that has narrowed the scope of personal jurisdiction in
complex legal actions.3 Moreover, BMS has become the landmark case
in a bigger story, one that is defining the balance of power in
multi-plaintiff aggregate litigation. 4
1. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017).
2. Id. at 1783.
3. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb
and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2018); Michael H.
Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 503–04, 505 (2018)
(“Just as courts and scholars once described changes introduced by International Shoe Co. v. Washington
as a ‘revolution,’ commentators have labeled the Court’s legal turn since 2011 a ‘revolution’ in personal
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)). Hoffheimer argues that “the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction
decisions are changing the shape of litigation” and that the new jurisdictional restrictions make it harder,
or even impossible, for plaintiffs to find feasible courts. Id. at 501–02; see also Thomas E. Riley & Conor
Doyle, Recent Developments in Products Liability, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 545, 546 (2018) (“In
recent years, the United States Supreme Court has greatly curtailed the ability of courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, with significant consequences for products liability
litigation. The Court’s decisions have been said to represent the ‘end of an era’ concerning courts’ ability
to exert jurisdiction over non-resident corporate defendants.”); Justin A. Stone, Note, Totally Class-Less?:
Examining Bristol-Myers’s Applicability to Class Actions, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 808 (2018)
(“Corporate defendants recently obtained a huge win in the U.S. Supreme Court, but the scope of the
victory remains unclear.”); Julialeida Sainz, The New Personal Jurisdiction: How the Supreme Court Is
Making It Easier for Corporate Defendants to Avoid Litigation, 5 ST. THOMAS J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 9
(2018) (“Throughout the history of personal jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed
the scope of personal jurisdiction to favor corporate defendants.”); Mary Anne Mellow, Steven T. Walsh
& Timothy R. Tevlin, Supreme Court Strikes Another Blow to Litigation Tourism in Bristol-Myers
Squibb, DEF. COUNS. J., Apr. 2018, at 1, 7 (“BMS is yet another nail in the coffin to the sometimes
mercenary rationale that previously allowed litigation tourism to flourish.”).
4. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1255–56 (“But Bristol-Myers’s real impact will not be on the
doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, it may not even be felt in much simple litigation. Instead,
Bristol-Myers is a landmark case in a different and perhaps bigger story about the balance of power in
complex litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
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Dissenting in BMS, Justice Sotomayor expressed fear that “the
consequences of the majority’s decision . . . [would] be substantial.”5
She noted, as she had done in other cases, that the majority’s opinion
had de facto “eliminate[d] nationwide mass actions in any [s]tate other
than [the state] in which a defendant is ‘essentially at home.’”6 As a
result, nonresident plaintiffs in those actions could no longer obtain
personal jurisdiction in fora outside the place of injury, the defendant’s
state of incorporation, or the state in which the defendant’s principal
place of business is located. 7 Even worse, according to Justice
Sotomayor, plaintiffs might not be able to proceed jointly in lawsuits
against two corporations headquartered and incorporated in separate
states when the claims arise in different fora. 8 This situation, she
warned, would effectively “curtail—and in some cases
eliminate—plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully accountable for
their nationwide conduct.”9
Although some scholars think that such concerns were
overstated—and the Supreme Court’s most recent personal
jurisdiction opinion from early 2021 suggests that the Court might be
prepared to take a more flexible, case-by-case approach to specific
jurisdiction in certain cases10—the BMS opinion left many open
5. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 1789 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)); see BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large multistate or multinational corporations that
operate across many jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is virtually inconceivable that such corporations
will ever be subject to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business or
of incorporation.”); Daimler, 571 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he
majority’s approach unduly curtails the States’ sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against
corporate defendants who have engaged in continuous and substantial business operations within their
boundaries.”).
7. See Riley & Doyle, supra note 3, at 550. In BNSF Railway. Co. v. Tyrrell, Justice Sotomayor made
a similar argument, highlighting how the majority’s position grants multinational corporations a
“jurisdictional windfall” and makes it virtually impossible to sue such corporations in national lawsuits
outside of their places of business or incorporation. BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 502
n.7.
9. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
10. See generally Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021) (finding
Montana and Minnesota courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over Ford, a global auto company
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questions that have split courts across the country.11 One such split, as
Justice Sotomayor cautioned, is “the question whether [the BMS]
opinion . . . also appl[ies] to a class action in which a plaintiff injured
in the forum [s]tate seeks to represent a nationwide class of plaintiffs,
not all of whom were injured there.”12 Following Justice Sotomayor’s
invitation, numerous scholars have since considered the effects of BMS
on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) and class actions.13 BMS’s impact
on other forms of aggregate litigation, however, remains understudied.
In particular, the growing split among the courts regarding the effects
of BMS on out-of-state plaintiffs in collective actions under the Fair
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan, in a products liability suit involving injuries to
state residents because, even though the specific vehicles were not sold, designed, or manufactured in
Montana and Minnesota, Ford sold, serviced, and advertised other cars of the same model in those states,
and the resident drivers were injured in those states, thus establishing a sufficient-enough relationship for
personal jurisdiction).
11. Riley & Doyle, supra note 3, at 551. Some authors have predicted that “cases like [BMS] will not
be split up and litigated in state courts all over the [nation]”:
Instead, they will wind up in [Multidistrict Litigation or MDL], which offers a
means of centralizing cases filed around the country before a single federal
judge. . . . Bristol-Myers is thus more than another chapter in the personal
jurisdiction saga; it is a milestone in the ascendancy of MDL as the centerpiece of
nationwide dispute resolution in the federal courts.
Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1256 (footnote omitted). Other authors noted that the BMS opinion would
not alter the jurisdictional analysis:
[T]he [BMS] Court’s fact-specific holding failed to establish a bright[-]line test for
finding a sufficient level of relatedness between a plaintiff’s claim and the
defendant’s contact with a forum[] and . . . will not greatly alter or impact the
specific jurisdiction analysis. Further, the opinion is not likely to result in a great
degree of negative consequences for plaintiffs litigating in mass actions.
Megan Crowe, Note, Can You Relate? Bristol-Myers Narrowed the Relatedness Requirement but
Changed Little in the Specific Jurisdiction Analysis, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 505, 505 (2019); see David W.
Ichel, A New Guard at the Courthouse Door: Corporate Personal Jurisdiction in Complex Litigation After
the Supreme Court’s Decision Quartet, 71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2018) (“The key point is that
for most cases, there is little reason to believe that there are not plenty of options open for the filing and
economically efficient prosecution of mass tort claims following the decision quartet.”); Riley & Doyle,
supra note 3, at 551 (“Two questions remain unsettled in the wake of BMS”: first, since the decision
concerned specific personal jurisdiction issues in state court, the opinion left open whether the same
restrictions apply in federal court; “[s]econd, it is unclear whether BMS will materially affect the
‘relatedness’ standard in the specific jurisdiction inquiry.”).
12. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Out of the Quandary: Personal Jurisdiction over Absent Class
Member Claims Explained, 39 REV. LITIG. 31, 32–33 (2019); Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers
Squibb Kill the Nationwide Class Action?, 129 YALE L.J.F. 205, 226 (2019); Grant McLeod, Note, In a
Class of Its Own: Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Worrisome Application to Class Actions, 53 AKRON L. REV.
721, 724 (2019); Kellie Lerner, William Reiss & Noelle Feigenbaum, Parting the Seas: Circuit Splits on
the Horizon, ANTITRUST, Fall 2019, at 48, 49; Stone, supra note 3, at 812–13; Bradt & Rave, supra note
3, at 1260–65.
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and to some extent, actions under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), requires attention. 14
To date, despite the rising number of collective actions nationwide,
only three U.S. Courts of Appeals have addressed—reaching disparate
results—whether the BMS rule regarding personal jurisdiction of
nonresident plaintiffs applies to collective actions; furthermore,
district courts are equally split.15
This Note will address the growing split among courts deciding
FLSA collective actions after BMS by proceeding in three parts. Part I
provides a brief and general overview of personal jurisdiction,
focusing on the epistemological shifts in the Court’s understanding of
14. Although the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is enforced through FLSA
collective action procedures, in substance the ADEA is closer to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Allan
G. King & Andrew Gray, The Unanimity Rule: “Black Swans” and Common Questions in FLSA
Collective Actions, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2017).
15. Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, No Longer a Second-Class Class Action? Finding Common
Ground in the Debate over Wage Collective Actions with Best Practices for Litigation and Adjudication,
11 FED. CTS. L. REV. 27, 29 (2019) (“Once a backwater topic compared to the Rule 23 class
action, . . . FLSA litigation grew over 500% from 1994 to 2014; it now is 3% of the entire federal civil
docket . . . .”); see generally Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022), petition
for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022); Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp., LLC, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir.
2021); Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S.
Feb. 2, 2022). District court cases that have declined to extend BMS to collective actions fall within the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See, e.g., Warren v. MBI Energy Servs.,
Inc., No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 937420 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2020), report and recommendation adopted
in part, No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 5640617 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2020); Gibbs v. MLK Express Servs.,
LLC, No. 18-cv-434-FtM-38, 2019 WL 1980123 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2019), report and recommendation
adopted in part, denied in part, No. 18-cv-434-FtM, 2019 WL 2635746 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2019); Aiuto
v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 2039946 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2020), motion to
certify appeal denied, No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 10054617 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020); Mason v. Lumber
Liquidators, Inc., No. 17-CV-4780, 2019 WL 2088609 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019), aff’d, No. 17-CV-4780,
2019 WL 3940846 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2019); O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp.
3d 591 (S.D.W. Va. 2020); Hunt v. Interactive Med. Specialists, Inc., No. 19CV13, 2019 WL 6528594
(N.D.W. Va. Dec. 4, 2019); Garcia v. Peterson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 863 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Seiffert v. Qwest
Corp., No. CV-18-70-GF, 2018 WL 6590836 (D. Mont. Dec. 14, 2018); Thomas v. Kellogg Co., No.
C13-5136, 2017 WL 5256634 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2017).
District court cases extending the BMS ruling to collective actions include courts in the Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g., Pettenato v. Beacon Health Options,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Hickman v. TL Transp., LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 890 (E.D. Pa.
2018); Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 18-cv-2409, 2019 WL 2924998 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2019); Turner v.
Utiliquest, LLC, No. 18-cv-00294, 2019 WL 7461197 (M.D. Tenn. July 16, 2019); Vallone v. CJS Sols.
Grp., LLC, 437 F. Supp. 3d 687 (D. Minn. 2020), aff’d, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021); McNutt v. Swift
Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, No. C18-5668, 2020 WL 3819239 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2020); Martinez v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 3d 386 (N.D. Tex. 2021); Parker v. IAS Logistics DFW, LLC, No. 20 C
5103, 2021 WL 4125106 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2021); Bone v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 20-CV-00697, 2021
WL 4307130 (D.N.M. Sept. 22, 2021).
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personal jurisdiction since 2011 as well as the history, development,
and specific features of FLSA collective actions, in comparison with
other forms of aggregate litigation. Part II analyzes the current split
among the various trial and circuit courts regarding the application of
BMS to FLSA collective actions, tracing the courts’ arguments both in
favor of and in opposition to this application. Finally, Part III offers a
discussion of the potential negative consequences of extending BMS
to collective actions in light of specific policy implications and
provides a recommendation on how to best approach personal
jurisdiction in the context of FLSA collective actions. Particularly, this
Note urges the Supreme Court, Congress, or both to formulate a clear
rule granting federal courts personal jurisdiction over defendants in
FLSA collective actions regarding the claims of opt-in plaintiffs,
regardless of their nonresident status.
I. BACKGROUND
This Section sets the stage for examining the district courts’
divergent applications of BMS to FLSA collective actions. First, it
looks at how the BMS opinion fits within the larger framework of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 16 Second, it offers an overview of
the historical developments and procedural specificities of FLSA
collective actions, in comparison with other forms of aggregate
litigation such as class actions and MDL.17 Finally, it introduces the
two main currents driving the split among the courts.18
A. Personal Jurisdiction
One of the foundational principles in American jurisprudence is the
requirement that courts have personal jurisdiction over the parties to
render a binding judgment. 19 When plaintiffs file suit, however, they
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. See A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 19 (5th ed. 2018).
The Supreme Court first articulated its concept of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff. 95 U.S. 714
(1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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consent to the power of the court, so personal jurisdiction issues
typically arise only with defendants. 20 At the state level, this power
over a nonresident defendant is ordinarily authorized by both state
statutory long-arm provisions and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.21 The Fifth Amendment authorizes the scope of
personal jurisdiction at the federal level, and “limits federal courts to
exercising jurisdiction over litigants having minimum contacts with
the United States as a whole.”22 Yet absent a congressional provision
of nationwide service of process, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)
(Rule 4(k)) constrains the federal court’s reach of personal jurisdiction
to the provisions of the state where the court is located.23
Since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as
requiring that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with [the
forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”24 Depending
on how related the defendant’s contacts are to the forum, a court can
exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over that
defendant.25 General jurisdiction allows the court to hear any claim

20. SPENCER, supra note 19.
21. Id. at 44–45 (“States identify the range of circumstances in which they wish to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants through jurisdictional statutes (often referred to as long-arm
statutes). . . . Once it is determined that such statutory authority indeed exists, it then becomes necessary
to determine whether [personal jurisdiction is constitutional].”); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
22. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FLA. L. REV. 979, 994, 996,
997 (2019) (emphasis omitted); see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state where the district court is located . . . .”); see SPENCER, supra note 19, at 20. Although the
constitutional provision limiting a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases
is not the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Fifth Amendment, when a federal statute does not authorize
nationwide service of process, federal courts must follow Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) (Rule 4(k))
to effectuate service of process and conduct the same personal jurisdiction analysis as in a diversity case
pursuant to the state’s long-arm statute. Hager v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 19-cv-00484, 2020 WL 5806627,
at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 29, 2020).
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
25. See SPENCER, supra note 19, at 42.
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against the defendant, regardless of where it arose. 26 After the Court’s
2014 opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman, general jurisdiction for
corporations has essentially been reduced to two “at home” locations:
(1) the state of the corporation’s headquarters and (2) the state of
incorporation.27 Thus, the Daimler decision considerably reduced the
reach of state and federal courts in cases implicating nonresident
plaintiffs and limited plaintiffs’ forum choices in nationwide mass
torts actions.28
With specific personal jurisdiction, the Court has not provided a
bright-line rule akin to the “at home” test for general personal
jurisdiction.29 Over time, however, the Court has interpreted
International Shoe’s specific jurisdiction standard to require a
three-prong test: (1) the defendant must have “purposefully availed”
itself of the forum state; so that the claims (2) “arise out of or relate to”
the defendant’s activities in that state, and it can reasonably foresee
being sued there; and (3) it must be fair and reasonable for the forum
state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 30 Since 2011,
26. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A court may assert
general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when their affiliations with the [s]tate are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them
essentially at home in the forum [s]tate.” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)). Before the Court’s opinions
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman, corporate and global
defendants could potentially be subject to personal jurisdiction all over the country, as long as they had
continuous and systematic contacts in the forum state. Mellow et al., supra note 3, at 2; Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014).
27. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. The Court acknowledged the possibility of extraordinary circumstances
in which a state could assert general jurisdiction over a corporation that has its headquarters or place of
incorporation elsewhere, but to date that continues to be a hypothetical scenario. Stone, supra note 3, at
810. In BNSF Railway Co., the Court reinforced Daimler’s standard by holding that even though “BNSF
has over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana,” the forum state could
not exercise general jurisdiction over it because it was neither incorporated nor headquartered there. BNSF
Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017); see Mellow et al., supra note 3, at 3.
28. Ashley Simpson, Brett Clements, Amy Antoniolli, Ryan Granholm, Alex Garel-Frantzen, Meghan
McMeel, Kevin O’Hara, Brian Watson et al., Recent Developments in Toxic Tort & Environmental Law,
53 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 683, 690 (2018).
29. Crowe, supra note 11, at 507.
30. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1785–86 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“Our cases have set out three conditions for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. First, the defendant must have ‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum [s]tate’ or have purposefully directed its conduct into the forum
[s]tate. Second, the plaintiff’s claim must ‘arise out of or relate to’ the defendant’s forum conduct. Finally,
the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable under the circumstances.” (first alteration in original) (first
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after a long period of silence regarding the constitutional limit of
personal jurisdiction, the Court has heard seven personal jurisdiction
cases, mostly narrowing the doctrine of personal jurisdiction and the
power of courts to hear certain cases. 31 The Court has focused
specifically on the “arise out of or relate to” requirement of personal
jurisdiction only in its two latest opinions—BMS and Ford Motor Co.
v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court.32 BMS came close to
and second citations omitted) (first quoting J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011)
(plurality opinion); and then quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984))); see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
319)); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Crowe,
supra note 11, at 508; Stone, supra note 3, at 811. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, a
“stream of commerce” case, the Court distinguished five fairness factors that can either lower or raise the
possibility of establishing minimum contacts. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). These factors are as follows:
[1 T]he burden on the defendant, . . . [2] the forum State’s interest in adjudicating
the dispute, [3] the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, . . . [4] the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies[,] and [5] the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies . . . .
Id. (citations omitted). In other “stream of commerce” cases, such as J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, the Court stated that “the stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate
of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures” and adopted a
“forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis” to determine whether a foreign defendant’s
actions meant it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum. 564
U.S. at 884, 886 (plurality opinion); James P. Donohue, Traditional Principles of Personal
Jurisdiction—Principles of Specific Jurisdiction—Stream of Commerce, in 1 INTERNET LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9:7, § 9:7, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2021). In Nicastro, the Court held that a British
manufacturing company that used a United States distributor to sell its products in the country was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in a New Jersey products liability action because the company’s activities
did not reveal its intent to purposefully avail itself of the protections of the forum state. Id.
31. See Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 501; see also Andre M. Mura, Staying on Track After
Bristol-Myers, TRIAL, Apr. 2019, at 18, 19. For example, from 1989 to 2011, the Court only ruled once
on personal jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior Court. 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Hoffheimer, supra note 3,
at 501 n.4. The Court found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the district courts violated
constitutional due process in the following six cases: Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773; BNSF Ry. Co., 137
S. Ct. 1549; Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Daimler, 571 U.S. 117; Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915; and
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873. Hoffheimer, supra note 3, at 501 n.6. In 2021, the Court reversed this trend for
the first time since 2011 by finding a “close enough” connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and the
activities of a nonresident global auto company in the forum states “to support specific jurisdiction.” Ford
Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1032 (2021). Interestingly, the renewed interest
of the Court in personal jurisdiction coincided with the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens in 2010.
Mura, supra.
32. Patrick J. Borchers, Richard D. Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, Ford Motor Company v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District Court: Lots of Questions, Some Answers, 71 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1, 3 (2021);
Ford, 141 S. Ct. 1017; see Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Cassandra Burke Robertson & Linda Sandstrom
Simard, Ford’s Jurisdictional Crossroads, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 102, 105 (2020).
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providing a bright-line rule with respect to the relatedness
requirements of a defendant’s contacts to the forum state by explicitly
rejecting flexible sliding scales in favor of a direct connection between
the injury and the defendant’s contacts to the forum.33 This trend,
however, came to a halt in Ford, the first case since 2011 in which the
Court found that specific personal jurisdiction was satisfied because it
did not require a “strict causal relationship between the defendant’s
in-state activity and the litigation.”34
1. Bristol-Myers Squibb
In BMS, the Supreme Court added new limits to the relatedness test
for specific personal jurisdiction in a mass tort action.35 Eighty-six
California residents and five hundred ninety-two nonresidents (from
thirty-three different states) used ordinary party joinder rules to file a
mass action consisting of thirteen tort claims (originally filed in eight
separate complaints) in California state court, alleging that
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s blood-thinning drug, Plavix, made them
sick.36 Bristol-Myers Squibb (Bristol-Myers) is a major
pharmaceutical company headquartered in New York and
incorporated in Delaware. 37
33. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“[T]he California Supreme Court’s ‘sliding scale approach[,]’
[which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction,] is difficult to square with our
precedents. . . . The [California] Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without
identifying any adequate link between the [s]tate and the nonresidents’ claims.”).
34. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 (“[W]e have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always
requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s claim came about because of the defendant’s
in-state conduct.”).
35. See supra Introduction; Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773; see also Anna-Katrina S. Christakis,
Matthew Stromquist & Carter Stewart, Class Action Developments, 74 BUS. LAW. 561, 564–67 (2019)
(discussing BMS).
36. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. Litigation against Bristol-Myers regarding Plavix proliferated
all over the country, with much of the litigation consolidated in an MDL assigned to District of New
Jersey Judge Freda Wolfson. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1274. To avoid MDL, plaintiffs, like those
in the BMS litigation, have sought to build a case outside the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction
(that is, as a state-law case, not removable either under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) or under
diversity jurisdiction). Id. Thus, BMS could not be removed for two reasons: (1) each complaint joined
fewer than one hundred plaintiffs to avoid removal under CAFA, and (2) the plaintiffs joined a second
defendant, the California distributor McKesson, to avoid complete diversity. Id. at 1275. As a mass action,
BMS followed the permissive joinder rules under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 (Rule 20). Stone,
supra note 3, at 819.
37. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
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The California Superior Court first denied Bristol-Myers’s motion
to quash the service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction on
the grounds that Bristol-Myers’s extensive activities in California
provided for general personal jurisdiction. 38 The California Court of
Appeal followed suit, rejecting Bristol-Myers’s writ of mandate. 39
After Daimler, which the Supreme Court decided while BMS was
pending, the California Court of Appeal changed its decision on
general jurisdiction but concluded that the Superior Court nevertheless
still had specific personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers.40 A divided
California Supreme Court affirmed the specific jurisdiction grant. 41
38. Id. at 1778; see Plavix Prod. & Mktg. Cases, No. JCCP4748, 2013 WL 6150251, at *2 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (“BMS’s wide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California . . . are
clearly sufficient to establish . . . general jurisdiction over it. Because BMS engages in extensive
activities . . . and thus enjoys the benefits and protections of its laws, this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction
over BMS comports with [International Shoe].”), aff’d sub nom. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Ct., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773
(2017).
39. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. Bristol-Myers has five research and laboratory facilities with
around 160 employees in California; the company also employs about 250 sales representatives in the
state, and it maintains a state-government advocacy office there. Id. Although Bristol-Myers did not
develop, manufacture, label, package, or create a marketing strategy for Plavix in California, it sold almost
187 million Plavix pills in the state between 2006 and 2012, comprising more than 900 million dollars.
Id. Moreover, Bristol-Myers contracted with McKesson, its California co-defendant, to distribute Plavix
nationwide. Id. at 1783.
40. Id. at 1778. The California Court of Appeal reasoned:
Although BMS’s contacts with California that were described by the trial court no
longer suffice under Goodyear and Daimler for assertion of general jurisdiction,
they remain pertinent and persuasive for the first step of a specific jurisdiction
analysis. BMS’s extensive, longstanding business activities in California . . . bear
no resemblance to the “random, fortuitous, and attenuated” interests held to be
insufficient in World-Wide Volkswagen and Walden. They provide evidence of far
more than the minimum contacts necessary under International Shoe to support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 433 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014)), aff’d, 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
41. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. The California Supreme Court concluded:
[I]n light of BMS’s extensive contacts with California, encompassing extensive
marketing and distribution of Plavix, hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue
from Plavix sales, a relationship with a California distributor, substantial research
and development facilities, and hundreds of California employees, courts may,
consistent with the requirements of due process, exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs’ claims in this action, which arise from the
same course of conduct that gave rise to California plaintiffs’ claims: BMS’s
development and nationwide marketing and distribution of Plavix. BMS cannot
establish unfairness: Balancing the burdens imposed by this mass tort action, and
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Applying a “sliding scale approach,” the majority found specific
personal jurisdiction by weighing the relatedness of Bristol-Myers’s
contacts to the forum against the quantity of those contacts. 42 The
California Supreme Court held that Bristol-Myers’s “extensive
contacts in California” coupled with the similarity of the nonresident
claims to those of California residents (where specific jurisdiction was
valid) supported finding specific personal jurisdiction.43
The Supreme Court reversed, comparing this sliding scale approach
to “a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”44 Justice Alito,
writing for the BMS majority, concluded that the out-of-state plaintiffs
could not sue Bristol-Myers in California because their specific
injuries occurred outside of that forum state. 45 That is, the nonresident
plaintiffs had neither “obtained Plavix through California physicians
or from any other California source; nor did they claim that they were
injured by Plavix or were treated for their injuries in California.”46
Even if they had similar claims to other California plaintiffs, the Court
reasoned, Bristol-Myers’s relationship to resident third parties was
insufficient to allow the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction over
Bristol-Myers for the nonresidents’ claims.47 As such, BMS’s holding
given its complexity and potential impact on the judicial systems of numerous other
jurisdictions, we conclude that the joint litigation of the nonresident plaintiffs’
claims with the claims of the California plaintiffs is not an unreasonable exercise
of specific jurisdiction over defendant BMS.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 894 (Cal. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
42. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778; see Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 889 (“[We] adopted a sliding
scale approach to specific jurisdiction in which we recognized that ‘the more wide ranging the defendant’s
forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.’”
(quoting Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1098 (Cal. 1996))).
43. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779.
44. Id. at 1781.
45. Id. (“[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did not purchase Plavix in
California, did not ingest Plavix in California, and were not injured . . . in California.”).
46. Id. at 1778.
47. Id. at 1781 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in
California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State
to assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”); see Spencer, supra note 13, at 32. Around
2011, Plavix was the best-selling prescription drug in the United States, yielding over forty billion dollars
in revenue for Bristol-Myers. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1274. Thus, prior to 2011, when Goodyear
was decided, Bristol-Myers would most likely have been subject to general personal jurisdiction in
California based on its systematic contacts with the state, such as almost one billion dollars in sales,
business registration in the state, operation of five offices, and employment of some four hundred people
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hardened the relatedness requirement needed for specific personal
jurisdiction by suggesting that the meaning of “arise out of or relate
to” requires that a defendant’s contacts with the forum include the very
product that injured the plaintiff. 48 Yet “the Court failed to provide
[further] guidance as to [this] requirement beyond its determination
that a relationship between the defendant and a third party [plaintiff]
is not enough to connect a claim with a forum.”49 Although the Court
concluded that mass-action plaintiffs could only file a consolidated
lawsuit in a state with general jurisdiction over the defendant, 50 the
majority did not think that its holding would result in a “parade of
horribles.”51
in the state. Id. at 1275. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, however,
limiting general personal jurisdictions to the states where a corporation is either incorporated or
headquartered, California did not have general jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers, regardless of the
defendant’s extensive contacts in the state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); see Stone, supra note 3, at 810–11.
48. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781; id. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984); Crowe, supra note 11, at 514 (“The Court’s
holding demonstrated an attempt to narrow the scope of the relatedness requirement.”).
49. John V. Feliccia, Note, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court: Reproaching the Sliding Scale
Approach for the Fixable Fault of Sliding Too Far, 77 MD. L. REV. 862, 863, 864 (2018) (“Without
substituting an approach of its own, the Court left lower courts rudderless in navigating the expanse of
what constitutes an ‘adequate link’ for the purposes of specific jurisdiction.”).
50. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.
51. Id. at 1783–84. The Supreme Court majority specifically stated:
Our straightforward application in this case of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction will not result in the parade of horribles that respondents conjure up.
Our decision does not prevent the California and out-of-state plaintiffs from joining
together in a consolidated action in the [s]tates that have general jurisdiction over
BMS. BMS concedes that such suits could be brought in either New York or
Delaware. Alternatively, the plaintiffs who are residents of a particular [s]tate—for
example, the 92 plaintiffs from Texas and the 71 from Ohio—could probably sue
together in their home [s]tates. In addition, since our decision concerns the due
process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a [s]tate, we leave open the
question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.
Id. (citations omitted). In their brief, the nonresident plaintiffs contended that a ruling denying personal
jurisdiction over their claims:
[W]ould substantially disrupt the operations of the state courts, and likely the
federal courts as well. It would significantly increase the amount of
litigation—causing cases that previously proceeded together efficiently to be
adjudicated separately in courts around the nation, while also generating more
collateral litigation about claim and issue preclusion. Enormous segments of
complex civil litigation will be open to attack, and potentially unsalvageable. The
Due Process Clause has never before been read to require such disruptive results.
Brief of Respondents at 38, Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (No. 16-466), 2017 WL 1207530, at *38.
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The optimism of the BMS majority held true in Ford—a case
concerning two consolidated products liability lawsuits in which
forum-state residents sued Ford, a nonresident global auto company,
for injuries sustained while driving Ford cars in plaintiffs’ home
states.52 As mentioned above, Ford is the first personal jurisdiction
case since 2011 in which the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.53
Building on BMS, the defendant in Ford argued that specific personal
jurisdiction was improper because Ford did not design, manufacture,
or sell the specific cars that caused the injuries in the forum states; thus,
the plaintiffs could not establish that their injuries “arose out of” Ford’s
activities in the fora. 54 Yet surprisingly, the Court took a “markedly
different approach to relatedness than BMS,” reasoning that specific
personal jurisdiction does not always require proving a causal link
between the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s in-state activities.55
Sometimes, the Court concluded, the claims need only be factually
“related to” the defendant’s actions in the forum state for specific
personal jurisdiction to be proper.56 As such, the Court essentially
re-instituted a flexible sliding scale approach for specific personal
jurisdiction.57 The opinion, however, only dealt with plaintiffs who
were residents of the forum states, leaving the impact of BMS’s refusal
to grant specific personal jurisdiction over identical claims by
out-of-state plaintiffs largely unanswered.58
At least two issues have become important for district courts when
trying to decide whether to apply or reject BMS in the context of FLSA
collective actions and other forms of aggregate litigation. First,
because BMS focused on personal jurisdiction’s due process
requirements in a mass tort action under state law and before a state
court, the opinion left open “what, if any, impact [BMS should have]
52. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1022–23 (2021); Borchers et al.,
supra note 32, at 1.
53. See supra Part I.A; Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.
54. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026; Borchers et al., supra note 32, at 7.
55. Borchers et al., supra note 32, at 7; Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
56. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
57. See Borchers et al., supra note 32, at 9 (“How does a court decide which test (‘arise out of’ or
‘related to’) to use? Here, the Court also appeared to do what it refused to do in BMS: recognize (although
not in so many words) a sliding scale.”).
58. See id. at 11.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/12

16

Reyes Kipp: Jurisdiction at Work

2022]

JURISDICTION AT WORK

957

on a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction” in federal
question cases.59 Second, given that BMS involved numerous distinct
lawsuits with named plaintiffs that were consolidated as a state mass
action, the question remains whether the Court’s BMS ruling applies
to out-of-state defendants in other forms of aggregate litigation, such
as class and collective actions.60
B. Class Actions, Multidistrict Litigation, and FLSA Collective
Actions
Before the codification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) in September 1938—just one month before the passage of the
FLSA—decisions on representative litigation were scattered. 61 The
FRCP originally created three Rule 23 class action categories based on
the rights being litigated: “true” class actions (joint rights), “hybrid”
class actions (several rights concerning the same property), and
“spurious” class actions (rights involving a common question of
fact).62 The first two categories did not provide a mechanism for class
members to join affirmatively. 63 But the “spurious” class, by contrast,
required members to opt in to the action affirmatively and awarded

59. Christakis et al., supra note 35, at 566. Personal jurisdiction is different in a case in which
subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) rather than on federal
question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331). O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 591,
611 (S.D.W. Va. 2020). For federal question cases, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause merely
requires that defendants maintain “adequate contacts with the United States as a whole” rather than
specifically with the forum state. Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 99 (1st Cir. 2022)
(quoting United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001)), petition for cert. filed,
No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022).
60. Christakis et al., supra note 35, at 566–67.
61. Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions,
and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 284–85 (2009). Prior to 1938, there were only a few
isolated cases of representative litigation relegated to the Federal Equity Rules. Id. at 284.
62. Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 176 (2016); see also
William C. Jhaveri-Weeks & Austin Webbert, Class Actions Under Rule 23 and Collective Actions Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act: Preventing the Conflation of Two Distinct Tools to Enforce the Wage Laws,
23 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 233, 235 (2016).
63. Dodson, supra note 62. Unlike the modern version, the original Rule 23 did not require plaintiffs
to notify absent class members about the class action or to make an affirmative motion for class
certification; instead, defendants had to move to strike the class, proving that the requirements of Rule 23
were not satisfied. Jhaveri-Weeks & Webbert, supra note 62, at 236. Additionally, common questions
among the class did not have to “predominate” over other individual claims. Id.
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plaintiffs money damages, just like the FLSA collective action
mechanism does today.64
In 1966, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules revised Rule 23,
creating the modern class action.65 Under the modern rule, all class
actions must comply with four prerequisites: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 66 Additionally, Rule 23(b)
transformed the three prior class action categories into “‘mandatory’
classes; group-remedy classes; and economy-based, common-interest
classes.”67 Specifically, Rule 23(b)(3) transformed the “spurious”
action into the money-damages class action where the ruling binds all
class members unless they affirmatively opt out of the class.68
The 1960s saw the development of another aggregation
tool—MDL, codified in the Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968
(MDL Act).69 The MDL Act gives the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
64. Dodson, supra note 62, at 176, 209; see infra Part II.B.1.
65. Dodson, supra note 62, at 177.
66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
Id.
67. Dodson, supra note 62, at 177. Under Rule 23(b)(1), parties can maintain a class action if
prosecuting separate actions would create risk of inconsistent adjudications or adjudications that would
be dispositive of the interests of non-party members regarding the individual adjudications. FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(1). Under Rule 23(b)(2), parties can maintain a class action if “the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
Finally, under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action is proper when “the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Stone, supra note 3, at 813–15 (discussing the types of
class actions under Rule 23). The modern Rule 23 requires that courts affirmatively certify the class action.
Jhaveri-Weeks & Webbert, supra note 62, at 237.
68. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the Interstate
Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 400 (2004). Notice and opt-out rights are only mandatory in
money-damage class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Stone, supra note 3, at 815. In 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)
class actions, giving notice to unnamed members is discretionary because “constitutional due process
concerns are not as prevalent in these class action types.” Id.
69. Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407);
see Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1262–63.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/12

18

Reyes Kipp: Jurisdiction at Work

2022]

JURISDICTION AT WORK

959

Litigation ample powers to consolidate or centralize cases from courts
all over the country into a single federal court in any location.70 The
MDL judge, like any other federal district judge, has the power to
oversee discovery and make rulings on dispositive pretrial motions.71
In theory, the cases are to be remanded back to their original districts
at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings; however, in practice, remand
seldomly happens.72 For purposes of personal jurisdiction, such
transfer is valid as long as the case is filed in, or removed to, a district
court with personal jurisdiction over the defendant.73 Lately, many
mass tort actions like BMS are in MDL, which in 2015 comprised over
one-third of the federal civil docket.74
1. The FLSA
On June 25, 1938, after ten bill revisions, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt finally signed the FLSA into law. 75 Borrowing from earlier
legal provisions developed over the past seventy years, the FLSA
embodied a new compromise between labor unions and political party
factions to standardize labor laws and regulate interstate commerce. 76
For the first time in United States history, an omnibus federal statute
70. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1254, 1262. Multidistrict Litigation has been used to consolidate
mass torts, antitrust claims, securities actions, environmental suits, and claims involving business and
consumer fraud, among others. Ichel, supra note 11, at 50.
71. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1262.
72. Id. at 1263. About 97% of the transferred cases are concluded in the MDL court, either by a
settlement agreement or dispositive motion. Id.
73. Id. at 1258; see Ichel, supra note 11, at 51 (“Once an MDL proceeding has been established by the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, there will typically be later-filed ‘tag-along’ cases that are
either transferred to the district court presiding over the MDL proceeding as additional MDL cases or
directly filed in the MDL district court.”).
74. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1261; Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:
Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1913 (2017) (“[A]s of the fall of 2015, almost 40 percent of federal civil cases
were part of MDLs . . . .”).
75. Lopez, supra note 61, at 280; Carl Engstrom, Note, What Have I Opted Myself Into? Resolving
the Uncertain Status of Opt-In Plaintiffs Prior to Conditional Certification in Fair Labor Standards Act
Litigation, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1544, 1548 (2012). A year earlier, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
the Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, finding that Congress has the proper
authority to enact legislation to protect and advance interstate commerce. 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937); 1 LES
A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR LAW: COMPLIANCE AND PRACTICE § 1:2, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2021). This decision was important in supporting Congress’s revision of a wage
and hour law of general applicability. See id.
76. Lopez, supra note 61, at 280.
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recognized employees’ right to a minimum wage; standardized
eight-hour workdays and forty-hour workweeks; required
time-and-a-half overtime payments; and prohibited child labor.77 If an
employer violated the statute, the FLSA allowed the Secretary of
Labor or private plaintiffs to seek enforcement in a federal or state
court.78 Under the original statute, employees had three procedural
options: (1) bring a claim individually; (2) sue on their own behalf and
on behalf of other similarly situated employees; or (3) bring a claim
through an outside agent or representative.79
Soon after the FLSA’s enactment, a debate arose regarding the
definition of work time.80 Between 1944 and 1947, the Supreme Court
held in three separate cases that on-the-job travel time (or
“portal-to-portal” time) was work for FLSA purposes and had to be
considered in the calculation of wages and overtime payments. 81 In
both Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123
and Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers,
the Court held that the time it took miners to travel underground to the
mine was compensable work time. 82 In Anderson v. Mount Clemens
Pottery Co., importantly, the Court extended the “portal-to-portal” pay
to factories, holding that “the time necessarily spent by the employees
in walking to work on the employer’s premises, following the
punching of the time clocks, was working time.”83 This ruling soon
generated thousands of new suits, most of them brought by third-party

77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-219; 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:3; Lopez, supra note 61, at 280.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 2 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 20:7.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Lopez, supra note 61, at 280–81.
80. Lopez, supra note 61, at 281.
81. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal
Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84, as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014);
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945), superseded by
statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84; Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84, as
recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014); see 2 S CHNEIDER & STINE, supra
note 75, § 20:7.
82. Jewell Ridge Coal, 325 U.S. at 161; Tenn. Coal, 321 U.S. at 590; 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra
note 75, § 1:16.
83. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 691; 2 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 20:7.
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unions on behalf of their members, seeking back pay for
portal-to-portal violations under the FLSA.84
As a result, in 1947, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act
(PPA), making the first major and most enduring changes to the FLSA
since its enactment nine years earlier. 85 Congress envisioned the
following four primary objectives for the PPA that shape collective
actions to date: (1) to prohibit suits by union representatives on behalf
of workers; (2) to abolish opt-out class actions by requiring consent
from all plaintiffs before they join the lawsuit; (3) to provide notice to
employers by requiring employees to join the action early; and (4) to
bind opt-in plaintiffs to the outcome in the suit. 86 Such changes
represented a major victory for employers.87 In particular, the PPA
excluded travel to the workplace from compensable time, created a
two-year statute of limitations, provided employers with new defenses,
and restricted private rights of actions to individuals—eliminating
representative suits.88 These measures continue to distinguish
collective actions today. 89

84. 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:16 (“In the period between July 1, 1946[,] and January
31, 1947, 1,913 FLSA actions were filed in federal district courts. One case was settled for $4,656,000 to
4,200 employees for a period from September 9, 1940[,] to September 9, 1946. The actions were
predominately class action cases which were estimated to cover 395,223 employees.” (footnote omitted));
see also 2 id. § 20:7.
85. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 216,
251-262); see 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:16.
86. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1549.
87. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 283.
88. 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:15; Lopez, supra note 61, at 283–84.
89. In 1966, Congress amended the statute of limitations to provide for a three-year period of
limitations for willful violations. 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:17. Moreover, if an employer
does not post a notice regarding its employees’ FLSA rights, the period of limitations may be extended
under the equitable tolling doctrine. JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY § 3:17, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2021). Examples of new
defenses include: (1) the affirmative defense for reliance on administrative rulings, if the employer, in
good faith, acted in conformity with the Secretary of Labor’s written rules; and (2) a defense to the
assessment of liquidated damages, if the employer, acting in good faith, reasonably believed its acts or
omissions were in conformity with the FLSA. 1 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:17. During the
next forty years after the enactment of the PPA, the “key litigant” of FLSA actions was the government.
King & Gray, supra note 14, at 9. Yet this has changed considerably and currently, the “modern
landscape” comprises mainly private actions to recover money damages. Id. at 10; see also 2 SCHNEIDER
& STINE, supra note 75, § 20:1 (“[T]here has been a dramatic change in the litigation landscape. . . . At
this juncture, lawsuits filed by private parties comprise the vast majority of wage and hour lawsuits being
filed.”).
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2. Collective Actions Under the FLSA
Section 216(b) permits employees to join in collective actions
against any employer who violates the statute, providing:
An action . . . may be maintained against any employer
(including a public agency) in any [f]ederal or [s]tate court
of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to
any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which such action is brought. 90
This statutory language distinguishes collective actions from other
forms of aggregate litigation, notably Rule 23 class actions, in at least
four ways.91 First, potential plaintiffs must opt in to the lawsuit by
filing a written consent form. 92 Second, the FLSA requires that
plaintiffs are “similarly situated,” but the statute has left defining the
term to the courts. 93 Third, plaintiffs’ claims are not tolled for
statute-of-limitations purposes until a plaintiff consents. 94
90. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA describes several forms of enforcement: (1) the Department of
Justice can obtain criminal penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 216(a); (2) the Secretary of Labor can sue for civil
liability under 29 U.S.C. § 216(c), seek civil fines if the employer uses child labor under 29
U.S.C. § 216(e), or obtain an injunction under 29 U.S.C. § 217; and (3) employees may bring private
actions to seek back pay under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). SANCHEZ & KLAUSNER, supra note 89; see also 1
SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 1:3.
91. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 284–85. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 87 (1st Cir. 2022),
petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022). If the Department of Labor files the
representative action, employees do not have to opt in. King & Gray, supra note 14, at 9. In contrast, Rule
23 class actions follow an opt-out mechanism in which putative class members automatically become
plaintiffs once the class is certified, unless they affirmatively opt out of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2). In 1966, during the revision of Rule 23 and the creation of modern Rule 23(b)(3), the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules rejected any intentions to affect 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) with the new opt-out rule.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment, as reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 104
(1966); 2 SCHNEIDER & STINE, supra note 75, § 20:7.
93. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1550. In contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) classes seeking monetary judgments
must comply with a personal notice requirement, heightened certification prerequisites, and an opt-out
provision to protect the due process rights of absent class members. Lopez, supra note 61, at 286.
94. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1550. Under Rule 23 class actions, the claims of all members are
tolled starting on the date the lawsuit is filed. Id.
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Fourth, § 216(b) does not permit unnamed class members.95 That is,
all plaintiffs who opt in to a collective action have party status.96 Even
though the original plaintiffs can sue on a representative basis, “each
FLSA claimant has the right to be present in court to advance his or
her own claim . . . [and] only those plaintiffs who have opted in [to the
collective action] are bound by the results of the litigation.”97
Procedurally, the “similarly situated” requirement has evolved into
a two-step certification process first articulated in Lusardi v. Xerox
Corp., an age discrimination case brought under the ADEA.98 The first
procedural step is “conditional certification,” which imposes a low
burden of proof, requiring plaintiffs to merely show that they
“abstractly share common questions of fact with the rest of the
[collective]” and are therefore “similarly situated.”99 If the court grants
conditional certification, the plaintiff can send opt-in notices to other
prospective members. 100 The second step happens when the defendant
moves for decertification after discovery is complete or almost
complete, and the collective members have responded to the notice. 101
The court once again examines if the members are “similarly situated”

95. See King & Gray, supra note 14, at 13–14 (“In a collective action, no new legal entity is created,
and no lawyer is appointed to represent any group of plaintiffs. Rather, each member of the collective is
a ‘party-plaintiff’ and may be represented in the lawsuit by an attorney of his or her choosing.” (footnote
omitted)).
96. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1807 (3d ed. 2005), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2021).
97. Id. (footnote omitted).
98. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1551–52. Although the District Court of New Jersey first articulated
the two-step certification process in Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., the Fifth Circuit was the first appellate court
to endorse it in 1995. Id. The test is discretionary, but its application has become the norm. Id. at 1552;
see Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 122 F.R.D. 463, 465–66 (D.N.J. 1988) (using two-step certification process
on remand to de-certify class because the class was not “similarly situated”). ADEA and FLSA collective
actions developed together and still apply the same framework partly because Congress has required that
the ADEA be enforced through FLSA collective action procedures. King & Gray, supra note 14. Scholars
have noted, however, that the ADEA is closer to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 11. In
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, the Supreme Court gave lower courts procedural authority to
supervise the notification of other “similarly situated” employees to let them know of their right to join
the lawsuit. 493 U.S. 165, 170–71 (1989); see King & Gray, supra note 14, at 11–12. Equal-pay suits
under the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act also developed together and apply the same collective action
framework. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 96.
99. Lopez, supra note 61, at 288.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 289; Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1553.
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but this time under a heavier burden of proof. 102 If the court denies the
motion, the action will proceed as a collective; otherwise, the opt-in
plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice. 103
C. The Growing Split
Since 2017, the courts have struggled to determine how the BMS
rule applies to collective actions. 104 District courts that have declined
to extend BMS’s holding to collective actions generally draw from
Swamy v. Title Source, Inc. 105 The Swamy district court held that,
unlike the state law mass tort action at issue in BMS, FLSA collective
actions are “federal claim[s] created by Congress specifically to
address employment practices nationwide.”106 Thus, according to
these courts, applying BMS to collective actions “would splinter most
nationwide collective actions, trespass on the expressed intent of
Congress, and greatly diminish the efficacy of FLSA collective actions
as a means to vindicate employees’ rights.”107 In 2022, the First Circuit
similarly declined to follow BMS, concluding that in FLSA federal
question cases, once a federal court complies with service of process

102. Lopez, supra note 61, at 289.
103. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1553. Because of its treatment of opt-in plaintiffs, some commentators
have noted that FLSA collective actions are closer to mass actions than to Rule 23 class actions. See King
& Gray, supra note 14, at 17–18 (“Multi-plaintiff FLSA cases adhere to the mass action model. Although
these claims may raise common questions, there is no presumption that mere joinder diminishes any one
plaintiff’s burden of proof.”). Moreover, courts have noted that the FLSA conditional certification process
is less stringent than the permissive joinder of parties’ requirements under Rule 20. Id. at 23; Engstrom,
supra note 75, at 1573; see FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1) (“Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A)
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact
common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.”).
104. Compare, e.g., Garcia v. Peterson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 863, 880 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (“The
court . . . declines to extend the Bristol-Myers’ requirement to analyze personal jurisdiction with regards
to each individual plaintiff to the FLSA collective action jurisdictional analysis.”), with, e.g., Roy v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D. Mass. 2018) (“[T]he court concludes that
‘Bristol-Myers applies to FLSA claims, in that it divests courts of specific jurisdiction over the FLSA
claims of non-[Massachusetts employed] plaintiffs against [FedEx Ground].’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Maclin v. Reliable Reps. of Tex., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 845, 850 (N.D.
Ohio 2018))).
105. Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. C 17-01175, 2017 WL 5196780 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2017).
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id.
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under Rule 4(k), the Fifth Amendment authorizes jurisdiction over the
claims of nonresident plaintiffs.108
The district courts and appellate courts that have extended BMS to
collective actions generally draw from Maclin v. Reliable Reports of
Texas, Inc.109 In Maclin, an Ohio district court held that “[t]he federal
overtime claims of non-Ohio [plaintiffs] against [defendant] have less
of a connection to the [s]tate of Ohio than the non-California plaintiffs’
claims had to the [s]tate of California in [BMS].”110 Additionally, these
courts have concluded that even though BMS was about a mass action
in state court, as opposed to a federal court action, this distinction is
inconsequential because “the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
would [not] have any more or less effect on the outcome respecting
FLSA claims than the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
and this district court will not limit the holding in Bristol-Myers to
mass tort claims or state courts.”111 The following Section will further
analyze the reasoning supporting these two approaches.
II. ANALYSIS
On the one hand, district courts in the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply BMS to
FLSA collective actions.112 In 2022, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
108. Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 96 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[A]lthough serving a
summons in accordance with state or federal law is necessary to establish jurisdiction over a defendant in
the first instance, the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional limitations limit the authority of the court after
service has been effectuated at least in federal-law actions.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S.
Feb. 25, 2022).
109. Maclin, 314 F. Supp. 3d 845; see, e.g., Pettenato v. Beacon Health Options, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d
264, 278–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
110. Maclin, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 850.
111. Id. at 850–51.
112. This includes the District Court of Colorado in the Tenth Circuit, the Middle District of Florida
and Northern District of Georgia in the Eleventh Circuit, the Eastern District of New York in the Second
Circuit, the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia in the Fourth Circuit, the Southern District
of Texas in the Fifth Circuit, and the Northern District of California, Western District of Washington, and
the District of Montana in the Ninth Circuit. See generally Warren v. MBI Energy Servs., Inc., No.
19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 937420 (D. Colo. Feb. 25, 2020), report adopted in part, No. 19-cv-00800, 2020
WL 5640617 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2020); Gibbs v. MLK Express Servs., LLC, No. 18-cv-434-FtM-38,
2019 WL 1980123 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2019), report and recommendation adopted in part, denied in
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put to rest a split among the district courts in that circuit.113 On the
other hand, district courts in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have extended BMS to FLSA
collective actions.114 Both the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits—the other two circuit courts to have opined on the
issue—limited specific personal jurisdiction to the claims of in-state

part, No. 18-cv-434-FtM, 2019 WL 2635746 (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2019); Aiuto v. Publix Super Mkts.,
Inc., No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 2039946 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2020), motion to certify appeal denied, No.
19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 10054617 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020); Mason v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No.
17-CV-4780, 2019 WL 2088609 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019), aff’d, No. 17-CV-4780, 2019 WL 3940846
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2019); O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D.W. Va.
2020); Hunt v. Interactive Med. Specialists, Inc., No. 19CV13, 2019 WL 6528594 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 4,
2019); Garcia v. Peterson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 863 (S.D. Tex. 2018); Swamy, 2017 WL 5196780; Chavez v.
Stellar Mgmt. Grp. VII, LLC, 19-cv-01353, 2020 WL 4505482 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020); Sloan v. Gen.
Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Seiffert v. Qwest Corp., No. CV-18-70-GF, 2018
WL 6590836 (D. Mont. Dec. 14, 2018); Thomas v. Kellogg Co., No. C13-5136, 2017 WL 5256634 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 17, 2017).
The Middle District of Tennessee in the Sixth Circuit, and the Western District of Arkansas in the Eighth
Circuit declined to extend BMS to collective actions. See generally Hammond v. Floor & Decor Outlets
of Am., Inc., No. 19-cv-01099, 2020 WL 2473717 (M.D. Tenn. May 13, 2020); Turner v. Concentrix
Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-1072, 2020 WL 544705 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 3, 2020). In 2021, however, the Courts
of Appeals for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits went the other way, finding that the exercise of specific
personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs is not proper in FLSA collective actions.
See Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S. Feb.
2, 2022); Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp., LLC, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021).
113. Compare Chavira v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, No. 18-cv-10029, 2019 WL 4769101, at *6 (D. Mass.
Sept. 30, 2019) (finding BMS applies to FLSA collective action cases), and Roy v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D. Mass. 2018) (holding BMS applies to FLSA claims), with Waters v.
Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 455, 460–61 (D. Mass. 2020) (finding BMS does not
apply to FLSA claims), aff’d, 23 F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb.
25, 2022).
114. This includes the Southern District of New York in the Second Circuit; the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in the Third Circuit; the Northern District of Texas in the Fifth Circuit; the Northern District
of Illinois in the Seventh Circuit; the District of Minnesota in the Eighth Circuit; the Western District of
Washington in the Ninth Circuit; the District of New Mexico in the Tenth Circuit; and the Northern and
Southern Districts of Ohio, as well as the Western and Middle Districts of Tennessee in the Sixth Circuit.
See generally Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d 264; Hickman v. TL Transp., LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 890 (E.D.
Pa. 2018); Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp., LLC, 437 F. Supp. 3d 687 (D. Minn. 2020), aff’d, 9 F.4th 861 (8th
Cir. 2021); McNutt v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, No. C18-5668, 2020 WL 3819239 (W.D. Wash.
July 7, 2020); Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 18-cv-2409, 2019 WL 2924998 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2019);
Hutt v. Greenix Pest Control, LLC, No. 20-cv-1108, 2020 WL 6892013 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2020); Turner
v. Utiliquest, LLC, No. 18-cv-00294, 2019 WL 7461197 (M.D. Tenn. July 16, 2019); Canaday v. Anthem
Cos., 441 F. Supp. 3d 644 (W.D. Tenn.), report and recommendation adopted, 439 F. Supp. 3d 1042
(W.D. Tenn. 2020), aff’d, 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S. Feb. 2,
2022); Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 3d 386 (N.D. Tex. 2021); Parker v. IAS Logistics
DFW, LLC, No. 20 C 5103, 2021 WL 4125106 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2021); Bone v. XTO Energy, Inc., No.
20-CV-00697, 2021 WL 4307130 (D.N.M. Sept. 22, 2021).
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plaintiffs.115 This divided landscape, cutting across courts within the
same judicial districts and circuits, highlights the need for further
guidance from Congress and the Supreme Court to define the scope of
specific personal jurisdiction in collective actions.116
A. The Swamy Line
Broadly, the First Circuit and the district courts that follow Swamy
point to four main reasons for interpreting BMS’s holding narrowly:
(1) contrary to mass tort actions, collective actions entail a single suit;
(2) their two-step certification process favors a jurisdictional analysis
grounded on the original plaintiff; (3) collective actions do not pose
the same forum shopping or federalism concerns as state mass torts;
and (4) even if courts could find similarities between mass actions and
collective actions, Congress clearly intended to empower employees
nationwide to join against unfair labor practices. 117
1. Specific Jurisdiction at the Level of the Suit
In BMS, the Supreme Court stated that for a court to exercise
specific jurisdiction over a defendant, “‘the suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of
or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”118 District
courts in Colorado, Georgia, and Virginia have distinguished
collective actions from mass tort actions by narrowing the specific
115. See generally Canaday, 9 F.4th 392; Vallone, 9 F.4th 861.
116. For instance, in the Second Circuit, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York have reached
opposite conclusions. Compare Mason, 2019 WL 2088609, at *6 (declining to apply BMS to FLSA
collective actions), with Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 278–79 (applying BMS to FLSA collective actions).
The Western District of Washington in the Ninth Circuit is equally divided. Compare Thomas, 2017 WL
5256634, at *1 (noting that, even though the defendant waived any objection to lack of personal
jurisdiction, BMS may not even apply), with McNutt, 2020 WL 3819239, at *8–9 (extending BMS to
FLSA collective actions). Finally, the Southern and Northern Districts of Texas in the Fifth Circuit are
also split. Compare Garcia, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 880 (“The court . . . declines to extend the Bristol-Myers’
requirement to analyze personal jurisdiction with regards to each individual plaintiff to the FLSA
collective action jurisdictional analysis.”), with Greinstein v. Fieldcore Servs. Sols., LLC, No.
18-CV-208-Z, 2020 WL 6821005, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2020) (“The [c]ourt finds the
straight-forward application of BMS means this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over potential
out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims.”).
117. See, e.g., Aiuto, 2020 WL 2039946, at *5 (pointing out these four reasons based on Swamy).
118. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (alterations in original)
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)).

Published by Reading Room, 2022

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 12

968

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:3

personal jurisdiction analysis to the level of the named parties in the
original suit who are acting in a representative capacity. 119 The First
Circuit in Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc. has further
explained that once the named plaintiffs of a collective action have
properly served the defendant under Rule 4(k), the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to federal law claims anymore, and a
federal district court is authorized to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction regarding the claims of nonresident, opt-in plaintiffs under
the Fifth Amendment. 120 That is, in collective actions “the named
plaintiff . . . is the only party responsible for serving the summons[]
and thus the only party subject to Rule 4.”121
Contrary to BMS, where plaintiffs consolidated eight initial suits
into one large mass action, FLSA collective actions comprise one
single suit from the start. 122 This distinction is important, these courts
have concluded, because only the original suit between a named
plaintiff and defendant counts for purposes of assessing specific
personal jurisdiction.123 That other plaintiffs must opt in later in
collective actions “does not change the dynamics of the suit which

119. Warren v. MBI Energy Servs., Inc., No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 937420, at *6 (D. Colo. Feb. 25,
2020), report adopted in part, No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 5640617 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2020); Aiuto, 2020
WL 2039946, at *5; O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 591, 613–14 (S.D.W.
Va. 2020); Hager v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 19-cv-00484, 2020 WL 5806627, at *6 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 29,
2020); Hunt v. Interactive Med. Specialists, Inc., No. 19CV13, 2019 WL 6528594, at *3 (N.D.W. Va.
Dec. 4, 2019).
120. Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 96 (1st Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed,
No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022). According to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, even if the
FLSA does not explicitly authorize nationwide service of process, “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not bar
an out-of-state plaintiff from suing to enforce their rights under a federal statute in federal court if the
defendant maintained the ‘requisite “minimum contacts” with the United States.’” Id. at 92 (quoting
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992)).
121. Id. at 99.
122. See, e.g., id. at 96–97 (“[T]he FLSA and its legislative history show that Congress created the
collective action mechanism to enable all affected employees working for a single employer to bring suit
in a single, collective action . . . .”).
123. Hunt, 2019 WL 6528594, at *3 (“Bristol-Myers Squibb’s holding does not extend to collective
actions under the FLSA because, ‘unlike Bristol-Myers Squibb, there is only one suit: the suit between
Plaintiff and [the] Defendant[s]. While Plaintiff may end up representing other class members, this is
different than a mass action where independent suits with independent parties in interest are joined for
trial.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., No. 17-cv-00085, 2018 WL
3580775, at *5 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2018))); see also Warren, 2020 WL 937420, at *6; Aiuto, 2020 WL
2039946, at *5.
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remains between the plaintiff and defendant.”124 Thus, these courts
reason that as long as the initial suit before the court “arises out of and
relates to” the defendant’s contact with the forum, the exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction is permissible. 125 This approach is
consistent with pre-BMS practices, which have traditionally allowed
jurisdiction over the defendant regarding out-of-state plaintiffs if the
exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper in relation to the original
plaintiff.126
2. Jurisdiction at the Conditional Certification Stage
District courts in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Montana have
emphasized that, given the two-step certification process in collective
actions, applying BMS’s limiting jurisdictional analysis does not make
sense.127 These courts have concluded that requiring district courts to
exclude out-of-state plaintiffs at the conditional certification stage
would “put[] the proverbial cart before the horse.”128 At such an early
stage, plaintiffs need only meet the burden of establishing that the
“putative class members were together the victims of a single decision,

124. Hager, 2020 WL 5806627, at *6 (quoting Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 464 F. Supp.
3d 455, 460 (D. Mass. 2020), aff’d, 23 F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S.
Feb. 25, 2022)).
125. Aiuto, 2020 WL 2039946, at *5 (“In stark contrast to the mass tort action in Bristol-Meyers [sic],
the suit before the [c]ourt today does arise out of and relate to Defendant’s contacts with Georgia.”);
O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 591, 614 (S.D.W. Va. 2020) (“So long as the
named plaintiff in an FLSA action was injured in the forum state by the defendant’s conduct then the
‘suit’ arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”).
126. See, e.g., Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1021–22 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (analyzing specific jurisdiction in the context of a hybrid class and collective action only as to the
named plaintiffs). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, considers that extending BMS to
collective actions “does not seem likely to disrupt the way FLSA collective actions traditionally have been
filed, at least as measured by the fact patterns in U.S. Supreme Court decisions.” Canaday v. Anthem
Cos., 9 F.4th 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2022).
127. See Warren, 2020 WL 937420, at *3; Aiuto, 2020 WL 2039946, at *2; Seiffert v. Qwest Corp.,
No. CV-18-70-GF, 2018 WL 6590836, at *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 14, 2018); Gibbs v. MLK Express Servs.,
LLC, No. 18-cv-434-FtM-38, 2019 WL 1980123, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2019), report and
recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 18-cv-434-FtM-38, 2019 WL 2635746 (M.D. Fla.
June 27, 2019).
128. Warren v. MBI Energy Servs., Inc., No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 5640617, at *2 (D. Colo. Sept.
22, 2020).
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policy, or plan.”129 These courts have reasoned that FLSA collective
actions require that employees can notify all possibly affected workers
by providing them with accurate and timely notice of the suit, so they
can decide whether they want to opt in. 130 This issuance of notice, the
courts reason, does not offend defendants’ due process concerns.131
Moreover, applying a BMS jurisdictional analysis at the conditional
certification stage would increase a plaintiff’s burden in what is
supposed to be a lenient evidentiary stage. 132 Additionally, from a
practical perspective, applying BMS would cause potential delays if
the court must analyze jurisdiction each time there is a new opt-in
plaintiff.133 Thus, according to these courts, maintaining the
jurisdictional scope regarding the named plaintiff makes the most
sense because the main issue at the conditional certification level is
simply whether the putative collective can receive notice of the
action.134 In Waters, the First Circuit explained that the FLSA’s
requirement that plaintiffs are “similarly situated” is even less stringent
than permissive party joinder requirements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 20 (Rule 20).135 Thus, given that plaintiffs joined under
Rule 20 are not subject to Rule 4(k) requirements, additional opt-in

129. Id. (quoting Norwood v. WBS, Inc., No. 15-cv-00622, 2016 WL 7666525, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
29, 2016)). Courts reason that “if the court denies a Rule 12(b)(2) motion [at this stage], it can later revisit
the jurisdictional issue when a fuller record is presented because [following a defendant’s jurisdictional
challenge,] the plaintiff ‘bears the burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction at every stage.’” Hager,
2020 WL 5806627, at *2 (quoting Sneha Media & Ent., LLC v. Associated Broad. Co. P Ltd., 911 F.3d
192, 196–97 (4th Cir. 2018)).
130. O’Quinn, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 605. But see Weirbach v. Cellular Connection, LLC, 478 F. Supp. 3d
544, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“[T]he [c]ourt cannot conditionally certify individuals over whose claims it
does not have personal jurisdiction. . . . Courts should only authorize notice to individuals who might be
in the collective.”).
131. See, e.g., Warren, 2020 WL 5640617, at *3.
132. Id. at *1, *3.
133. Warren v. MBI Energy Servs., Inc., No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 937420, at *7 (D. Colo. Feb. 25,
2020), report adopted in part, No. 19-cv-00800, 2020 WL 5640617 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2020); see Seiffert
v. Qwest Corp., No. CV-18-70-GF, 2018 WL 6590836, at *4 (D. Mont. Dec. 14, 2018) (“The issue of
whether a district court possesses personal jurisdiction cannot be premised upon the residence of each
opt-in plaintiff. No FLSA collective action case ever could reach the certification issue if the district court
had to evaluate whether it possessed personal jurisdiction over each new opt-in plaintiff.”).
134. Warren, 2020 WL 5640617, at *3; Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. C 17-01175, 2017 WL
5196780, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2017).
135. Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 96 (1st Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed,
No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022).
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plaintiffs in collective actions should be equally exempt of such
requirements.136
3. Federalism and Forum Shopping
If forum shopping by nonresident plaintiffs was a concern in BMS,
these district courts conclude that is not an issue in FLSA collective
actions.137 Congress specifically designed collective actions to allow
multiple “similarly situated” employees to join in a single suit. 138
Likewise, because collective actions are proper in federal court based
on federal question subject-matter jurisdiction, the anxieties over state
sovereignty voiced in BMS are not applicable.139 Unlike the state tort
claims at issue in BMS, FLSA collective actions involve federal claims
created by Congress specifically to address unfair employment
practices across the nation.140
4. Congressional Intent
In Swamy, the Northern District of California cautioned that
extending BMS’s holding to collective actions “would splinter most
nationwide collective actions, trespass on the expressed intent of
Congress, and greatly diminish the efficacy of FLSA collective actions
as a means to vindicate employees’ rights.”141 The First Circuit Court

136. See id. (“We are not aware of, and [defendant] has not cited, a case in which a court held
that Rule 4 applies to plaintiffs joined under Rule 20.”).
137. Warren, 2020 WL 937420, at *6; see Aiuto v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., No. 19-CV-04803, 2020
WL 2039946, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2020) (“In stark contrast to the mass tort action in Bristol-Meyers
[sic], the suit before the [c]ourt today does arise out of and relate to Defendant’s contacts with Georgia.
To that end, the forum-shopping concerns that animated Bristol-Meyers [sic] are not present in an FLSA
collective action.” (citation omitted)), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL
10054617 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020).
138. E.g., Warren, 2020 WL 937420, at *6–7.
139. O’Quinn v. TransCanada USA Servs., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 591, 614 (S.D.W. Va. 2020) (“The
anxiety surrounding federalism expressed in BMS is inapplicable to a FLSA action, based on federal
question jurisdiction and thus the constitutional limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment.”); see also
Hager v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 19-cv-00484, 2020 WL 5806627, at *6 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 29, 2020). In
BMS, the Court stated that the limitations imposed on personal jurisdiction are a result of the territorial
sovereignty of each state. 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
140. E.g., Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. C 17-01175, 2017 WL 5196780, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2017).
141. Id.; see also, e.g., O’Quinn, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
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of Appeals and the district courts that follow Swamy note that Congress
expressly created collective actions to allow employees to enforce their
labor rights.142 These courts reason that nowhere in the FLSA statute
did Congress limit collective claims to in-state plaintiffs.143 According
to these courts, Congress’s purpose in authorizing collective actions
was precisely to avoid multiple lawsuits by many employees harmed
in a similar manner by the same employer. 144 Extending BMS to
collective actions, therefore, “would contravene the explicit intent of
Congress in enacting the FLSA.”145 The fact that an FLSA action
might share some similarities with mass actions, the courts note, does
not trump congressional intent. 146

142. See, e.g., Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 23 F.4th 84, 96–97 (1st Cir. 2022) (“[T]he
FLSA and its legislative history show that Congress created the collective action mechanism to enable all
affected employees working for a single employer to bring suit in a single, collective action. The FLSA’s
purpose was to allow efficient enforcement of wage and hour laws against large, multi-state
employers . . . .”), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022); Swamy, 2017 WL 5196780,
at *2 (“This would splinter most nationwide collective actions, trespass on the expressed intent of
Congress, and greatly diminish the efficacy of FLSA collective actions as a means to vindicate employees’
rights.”); Warren, 2020 WL 937420, at *7; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (allowing employees to sue
individually or on behalf of “other employees similarly situated” against their employers for unfair labor
practices under the FLSA).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Swamy, 2017 WL 5196780, at *2; Seiffert v. Qwest Corp., No.
CV-18-70-GF, 2018 WL 6590836, at *2–3 (D. Mont. Dec. 14, 2018); Aiuto v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc.,
No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 2039946, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2020) (“Nothing in the plain language of
the statute limits its application to ‘similarly situated’ in-state plaintiffs.”), motion to certify appeal denied,
No. 19-CV-04803, 2020 WL 10054617 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2020).
144. Aiuto, 2020 WL 2039946, at *5.
145. Waters v. Day & Zimmermann NPS, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 455, 461 (D. Mass. 2020), aff’d, 23
F.4th 84 (1st Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1192 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2022). In § 202(a) of Title 29
of the United States Code, Congress describes the declaratory policy of the FLSA as follows:
The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and
instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor
conditions among the workers of the several [s]tates; (2) burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition
in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair
marketing of goods in commerce. That Congress further finds that the employment
of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
146. Waters, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 461.
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B. The Maclin Line
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, and the district courts originally
following Maclin, take a broad reading of the BMS opinion, grounding
their reasoning in two main principles: the need for uniformity and the
importance of textualism. 147
1. Uniformity
District courts in New York and Ohio stress that “[t]he
constitutional requirements of due process do[] not wax and wane
when the complaint is individual or on behalf of a class.”148 According
to the Sixth Circuit in Canaday v. Anthem Cos., because FLSA
collective actions are like mass actions, each individual opt-in plaintiff
must comply with all due process requirements.149 The courts conclude
that the fact that BMS dealt with Fourteenth Amendment due process
constraints on specific personal jurisdiction does not invalidate its
holding in the context of FLSA collective actions. 150
These courts argue that although personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases falls under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
which only requires that defendants have minimum contacts with the
United States as a whole, if the federal statute does not authorize
nationwide service of process, the jurisdictional analysis is the same
as in state court.151 Because the FLSA does not authorize nationwide
147. See generally Maclin v. Reliable Reps. of Tex., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 845, 850–51 (N.D. Ohio
2018) (finding BMS extends to FLSA collective actions not only because the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause would not affect FLSA actions differently from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause but also because nonresident plaintiffs can still file suit under the FLSA against defendants in their
home states); Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098
(U.S. Feb. 2, 2022); Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp., LLC, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021).
148. Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 18-cv-2409, 2019 WL 2924998, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2019)2017
WL 4217115; see, e.g., Pettenato v. Beacon Health Options, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 264, 278–79 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
149. See Canaday, 9 F.4th at 397.
150. See Maclin, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 850–51 (“Still, the [c]ourt cannot envisage that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause would have any more or less effect on the outcome respecting FLSA
claims than the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and this district court will not limit the
holding in Bristol–Myers to mass tort claims or state courts.”).
151. See Canaday, 9 F.4th at 398–99; Vallone, 9 F.4th at 865; Weirbach v. Cellular Connection, LLC,
478 F. Supp. 3d 544, 549–50 (E.D. Pa. 2020); McNutt v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, No. C18-5668,
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service of process, these courts reason, BMS’s state-court due process
analysis equally applies to collective actions filed in federal court. 152
Due process is an “instrument of interstate federalism,” and, after
BMS, the general principle is to “require[] a connection between the
forum and the specific claims” brought by the plaintiffs.153 Proponents
of this view consider that, similar to the BMS plaintiffs, putative
out-of-state members are not barred from filing a national FLSA
action; they simply must file the action in a state that has general
jurisdiction over the employer. 154
2. Textualism
District courts extending BMS to collective actions have held that a
judge’s “obligation to follow the law cannot be overshadowed by
‘even the most compelling’ policy arguments.”155 To find specific
personal jurisdiction, BMS requires courts to examine if all nonresident
plaintiffs’ relationships with a defendant involve contacts or conduct
within the forum state. 156 Because this requirement is binding and valid
Supreme Court precedent, these courts reason, all courts must follow
it regardless of serious policy concerns. 157 If Congress feels so
2020 WL 3819239, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2020); Alisoglu v. Cent. States Thermo King of Okla., Inc.,
No. 12-cv-10230, 2012 WL 1666426, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2012) (citing Omni Cap. Int’l v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 (1987)).
152. See, e.g., Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 278 (“Because the FLSA does not provide for nationwide
service of process, and because [defendant] has not consented to this [c]ourt’s jurisdiction over it with
respect to the claims of the out-of-state plaintiffs, the [c]ourt looks to [state] law and the Due Process
Clause to determine whether there is a sufficient nexus between those employees’ claims . . . and
defendants’ activity in [the state].”).
153. Rafferty, 2019 WL 2924998, at *7 (quoting Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., No. 17 C 8841, 2018 WL
5311903, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018), rev’d, 953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126
(2021)).
154. Canaday, 9 F.4th at 400–01; Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 280; Maclin, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 851.
155. Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 280 (quoting Chavira v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, No. 18-cv-10029,
2019 WL 4769101, at *6 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019)).
156. See, e.g., Vallone, 9 F.4th at 865 (“Each failure to pay wages . . . is a separate violation that gives
rise to a distinct claim. Personal jurisdiction [in collective actions] must be determined on a
claim-by-claim basis.” (citation omitted)).
157. Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 441 F. Supp. 3d 644, 652 (W.D. Tenn.) (“Like many of the judges and
magistrate judges to address this issue, I have concerns about the practical implications of applying
Bristol-Myers to FLSA collective actions. However, these policy concerns do not obviate my duty and
obligation to follow what appears to be binding Supreme Court precedent.”), report and recommendation

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/12

34

Reyes Kipp: Jurisdiction at Work

2022]

JURISDICTION AT WORK

975

inclined, it can always amend the FLSA to authorize nationwide
service of process as it has done with other statutes. 158 But in the
meantime, these courts hold that “plaintiffs wishing to take advantage
of the collective action procedures of the FLSA must sue their
employers either where specific personal jurisdiction can be obtained
or where that employer is at home.”159
3. Similarity of Collective Actions and Mass Actions
Courts that extend BMS to collective actions frame the issue of party
status differently than the Swamy courts.160 For these courts, every
individual plaintiff that opts in to the collective action has a full party
status.161 This framing, the Sixth Circuit and the Western District of
adopted, 439 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (W.D. Tenn. 2020), aff’d, 9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021), petition for cert.
filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2022); see also McNutt v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, No. C18-5668,
2020 WL 3819239, at *9 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2020).
158. Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 280; Canaday, 9 F.4th at 395–96, 398–99 (“While the FLSA shows
no reticence in setting nationwide labor standards, it does not establish nationwide service of process.”);
see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 22 (“Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant[] but also in any district wherein
it may be found or transacts business . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (“Any civil action or proceeding under
[the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] against any person may be instituted in the
district court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs.”); 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (“Any civil action under [the Anti-Terrorism Act] against any
person may be instituted in the district court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff resides
or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an agent.”); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (“Where an action
under [the Employee Retirement Income Security Act] is brought in a district court of the United States,
it may be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a
defendant resides or may be found . . . .”).
159. Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 280; see Weirbach v. Cellular Connection, LLC, 478 F. Supp. 3d
544, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2020). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
Even then, employees may file a nationwide collective action under the FLSA so
long as they do so in a forum that may exercise general jurisdiction over the
employer—namely its principal place of business or its place of incorporation. It is
not obvious, at any rate, that state-based collective actions are necessarily
inefficient. Congress apparently did not think so.
Canaday, 9 F.4th at 400–01.
160. Canaday, 9 F.4th at 397 (“The key link is party status. In an FLSA collective action, as in the mass
action under California law, each opt-in plaintiff becomes a real party in interest, who must meet her
burden for obtaining relief and satisfy the other requirements of party status.”); see McNutt, 2020 WL
3819239, at *8.
161. McNutt, 2020 WL 3819239, at *8; see Weirbach, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 551. The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania noted:
Some district courts that have declined to extend BMS to FLSA collective actions
have pointed to the analysis in BMS that focused at the “level of the suit.” Those
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Washington have argued, “requires the conclusion that FLSA opt-in
plaintiffs are analogous to the mass tort plaintiffs in [BMS].”162
Although the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have declined to extend
BMS to Rule 23 class actions, district courts following Maclin consider
FLSA collective actions “fundamentally different.”163 Their different
treatment of plaintiffs, the courts note, highlights the similarities
between mass and collective actions and the ultimate applicability of
BMS to collective actions.164 Contrary to the opt-out mechanism of
class actions, collective actions under § 216(b) require that plaintiffs
affirmatively opt in to the suit. 165 Furthermore, Congress expressly
added the opt-in feature to FLSA collective actions to ban
representative actions after the PPA.166 Following this reasoning, a
collective action is just an aggregation of “individual plaintiffs with
individual cases.”167 Thus, “it is properly viewed as a rule of joinder
courts draw a distinction between an FLSA case, in which there is one suit, and a
mass action where there are many individual suits. But in BMS, there were not
hundreds of individual suits. There were eight, because the plaintiffs amalgamated
themselves in a few complaints. Many, if not all, of those suits included at least one
California resident as a plaintiff. Thus, if one looked at the level of the “suit” in
those cases, they would have been proper. The issue, however, was whether
individual party plaintiffs could maintain their claims against a common
defendant . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
162. McNutt, 2020 WL 3819239, at *8; Canaday, 9 F.4th at 397; see also Vallone v. CJS Sols. Grp.,
LLC, 437 F. Supp. 3d 687, 691 (D. Minn. 2020), aff’d, 9 F.4th 861 (8th Cir. 2021); Turner v. Utiliquest,
LLC, No. 18-cv-00294, 2019 WL 7461197, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 16, 2019).
163. Canaday, 9 F.4th at 402–03 (“All in all, the representative nature of class actions may create an
exception to the general rules of personal jurisdiction recognized in Bristol-Myers for ‘mass actions’ and
applicable to collective actions under the FLSA. But that exception does not apply here.”); see Mussat v.
IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126 (2021); Lyngaas v. Curaden
AG, 992 F.3d 412, 418–19, 433 (6th Cir. 2021).
164. Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 279. Courts also argue that Rule 23 class actions contain additional
procedural safeguards against due process violations that are absent in FLSA collective actions. Canaday,
9 F.4th at 403.
165. Canaday, 9 F.4th at 402. The Sixth Circuit also noted that, contrary to class actions, plaintiffs in
collective action have the right to retain their own separate counsel. Id. at 403.
166. Id. at 402; Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 279.
167. Pettenato, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 279 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Campbell v. City of Los Angeles,
903 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2018)). The different consequences of certification under Rule 23
and § 216(b) further illuminate the distinctions. “In a Rule 23 proceeding in which the class has been
certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), the class is described and has independent legal status.” Roy v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 43, 58 (D. Mass. 2018) The only consequence of
conditional certification in collective actions, however, is that similarly situated employees will be sent a
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under which only the individual opt-in plaintiffs have legal status, not
the aggregate class of aggrieved employees.”168 By extension, the
courts hold, BMS must apply to all opt-in plaintiffs in collective
actions, just as it applies to each plaintiff in a mass tort suit. 169
Thus, the First Circuit and the trial courts that follow Swamy
interpret BMS’s holding narrowly by pointing heavily at congressional
intent, federal jurisdiction, and fairness, whereas the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits and the district courts that follow Maclin read BMS broadly
by focusing on the need of uniformity and textualism. 170 This fractured
terrain underscores the need for further guidance from either Congress
or the Supreme Court, or both, to delineate the limits of personal
jurisdiction in collective actions. The following Section offers a deeper
discussion of the potential negative consequences of extending BMS
to collective actions and provides a recommendation on how to best
approach this impasse.
III. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court, Congress, or both should formulate a clear rule
granting courts personal jurisdiction over nonresident employers in
FLSA collective actions with respect to the claims of out-of-state
plaintiffs, so long as the original plaintiffs’ claims are proper. The
reasons supporting this proposal are threefold: (1) limiting personal
jurisdiction in FLSA collective actions undermines congressional
policy regarding worker’s rights; (2) judicial efficiency is greater if

court-approved notice of the action, and if they decide to become parties to the lawsuit they must file their
own written consent with the court. Id. at 59. Thus, FLSA collective actions depend on the “active
participation of opt-in plaintiffs.” Id. (quoting Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215,
224 (3d Cir. 2016)).
168. Anjum v. J.C. Penney Co., No. 13 CV 0460, 2014 WL 5090018, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2014);
see Weirbach v. Cellular Connection, LLC, 478 F. Supp. 3d 544, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2020).
169. Canaday, 9 F.4th at 403 (“[C]ollective actions permit individualized claims and individualized
defenses, ‘in which aggrieved workers act as a collective of individual plaintiffs with individual cases.’”
(quoting Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1105)).
170. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
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collective actions take place in a single suit; and (3) a suit including all
available opt-in plaintiffs promotes uniformity and predictability.171
A. Worker’s Rights
Limiting personal jurisdiction to claims of in-state plaintiffs would
considerably undermine the legislative purposes of FLSA collective
actions.172 Congress specifically enacted the FLSA to prevent “labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers.”173 Federal regulations echo this mandate: “The minimum
wage and overtime pay requirements of the [FLSA] are among the
nation’s most important worker protections.”174 Moreover, Congress
envisioned the FLSA as part “of its power to regulate commerce
among the several [s]tates” and not only localized in-state employer

171. See infra Parts III.A., III.B., III.C. Leading scholarship on this issue has largely adopted the
Maclin-line argument that “[BMS] necessarily applies to FLSA collective actions, barring courts from
asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims . . . .” Adam Drake, Note, The FLSA’s
Bristol-Myers Squibb Problem, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1548 (2021) (emphasis added). Adam Drake,
for instance, contends that because plaintiffs in both FLSA collective actions and mass tort actions like
BMS have independent party status and follow “functionally indistinguishable” joinder procedures, there
can be no “meaningful distinction” between plaintiffs in mass torts and § 216(b) collective actions. Id. at
1539–41. Though Drake recognizes that “restricting FLSA collective actions in this way appears to
countermand Congress’s original intent by restricting FLSA collective actions to in-state plaintiffs,”
Drake still urges Congress—as the seemingly sole actor capable of saving collective actions from BMS’s
reach—to amend § 216 and provide for a nationwide service of process. Id. at 1544, 1548. Although the
value of legislative action to provide clear jurisdictional guidance cannot be denied, its necessity cannot
be known. In fact, limiting the solution to Congress may concede too much. The Supreme Court’s 2021
ruling in Ford suggests that specific personal jurisdiction is best analyzed on a case-by-case basis. See
generally Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021). Moreover, Drake’s view
obliterates the fact that § 216 is not merely a joinder device or a procedural tool (like Rule 20) but a
substantive statute that serves broad and important policy objectives. Drake, supra, at 1541
(describing § 216(b) as a “rule of joinder”). When Congress created the opt-in requirement to FLSA
collective actions in 1947, it carefully considered the burdens and benefits of representative litigation to
both employers and employees; yet the inclusion of out-of-state plaintiffs to those collective actions was
never at issue. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 283. Merely extending BMS to collective actions because the
joinder procedures are similar misses this point. This Note, therefore, favors taking a broader approach
that can include actions by both Congress and the Supreme Court.
172. See Swamy v. Title Source, Inc., No. C 17-01175, 2017 WL 5196780, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10,
2017).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
174. Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside
Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,122 (Apr. 23, 2004) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 541).
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matters.175 Because an employer’s unlawful conduct with regard to a
single worker is often insufficient to produce a financially viable
lawsuit, FLSA collective actions are central to the effective protection
of workers’ employment rights.176 Further, FLSA litigation plays an
“increasingly important role in enforcing state and federal wage
protections for low-income workers.”177 Without this mechanism of
aggregation, a private employment action may de facto leave
employees without access to the FLSA as a remedy or form of redress
to hold employers liable for labor violations. 178 Therefore, the
Supreme Court has also construed the FLSA “‘liberally to apply to the
furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction,’ [because]
broad coverage is essential to accomplish the goal of outlawing from
interstate commerce goods produced under conditions that fall below
minimum standards of decency.”179
Since the enactment of the PPA in 1947, which required that
employees opt in to the suit by consenting in writing, Congress
considerably limited the scope and reach of collective actions. 180 As
such, even before the BMS opinion raised novel issues about personal
jurisdiction limits for collective actions, only between fifteen and
thirty percent of all potential plaintiff-employees opted in to a
collective action, and even lower participation rates were not
uncommon.181 Issues such as high turnover in low-wage jobs and
frequent changes of address among low-wage workers, for instance,
175. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b) (emphasis added).
176. Lonny Hoffman & Christian J. Ward, The Limits of Comprehensive Peace: The Example of the
FLSA, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 265, 269 (2017); Brittany Cangelosi, Note, Wage War: Arbitration
and Class Action Waivers at the Expense of Wage and Hour Claims, 48 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 486, 491,
507 (2019).
177. Jhaveri-Weeks & Webbert, supra note 62, at 233.
178. Cangelosi, supra note 176, at 486.
179. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 296 (1985) (quoting Mitchell v.
Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)).
180. See Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting Parallel State Wage
Claims to Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009).
181. Id. at 518, 544. The “unattractiveness” of FLSA collective actions has produced an “explosion” of
hybrid lawsuits that either include both FLSA and Rule 23 wage claims, or completely forego the FLSA
claims. Id. at 544; see also Hoffman & Ward, supra note 176, at 269–70 (“[A] procedural system that
requires potential class members to opt in will always have a lower—usually, much lower—participation
rate. . . . The practical effect . . . is that it is much harder to privately enforce violations of the FLSA.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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have prevented reaching a large number of employees.182 Moreover,
recent case law suggests that collective action plaintiffs cannot provide
notice to those employees that signed an arbitration agreement. 183
Given this already constraining landscape, adding an additional
personal jurisdiction limitation would further restrict the size of a
potential collective action, making it more unattractive and less
effective to protect aggrieved employees. 184
B. Judicial Efficiency
In Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, the Supreme Court observed
that collective actions allow “plaintiffs the advantage of lower
individual costs to vindicate rights by the pooling of resources
[because the] judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one
proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same

182. Craig Becker & Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The
Peculiar Case of Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum
Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1326 (2008). In the janitorial industry, for instance, the annual
turnover rate in 2008 was approximately 250%, and a janitor’s average tenure was less than five months.
Id. Additionally, many potential plaintiffs throw mailed lawsuit notices away or decide not to join the suit
out of fear or retaliation. Id. at 1327–28. Moreover, because the statute of limitations under the FLSA
does not stay an employee’s claim until that employee consents to “opt in,” many employees lose their
right to recover if they receive a late notice and often receive a significantly reduced backpay award. Id.
at 1330. Often discovery costs and disputes are also higher than in class actions “because employees who
opt into an FLSA representative action are in an anomalous position under the discovery rules. They are
not one of the original named plaintiffs who brought the lawsuit. But they are also not unnamed class
members. They are something in between [a hybrid called] ‘party plaintiff[s].’” Id. at 1334 (second
alteration in original).
183. In Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held:
[W]hen a defendant opposing the issuance of notice alleges that proposed recipients
entered arbitration agreements waiving the right to participate in the action, a court
may authorize notice to those individuals unless (1) no plaintiff contests the
existence or validity of the alleged arbitration agreements, or (2) after the court
allows discovery on the alleged agreements’ existence and validity, the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a valid arbitration
agreement for each employee it seeks to exclude from receiving notice.
947 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 2020). See generally Recent Cases, Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 947 F.3d
1043 (7th Cir. 2020), 133 HARV. L. REV. 2601 (2020) (discussing Bigger).
184. Wage and hour violations are still a major problem in many cities. See Cangelosi, supra note 176,
at 485–86. For instance, a 2014 multi-city study of Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles revealed that
two-thirds of low-income workers suffered at least one wage theft violation each week. Id. at 485. For
example, Scholars estimated that in 2012 wage-theft victims recovered nearly one billion dollars. Id. at
492.
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alleged discriminatory activity.”185 This assertion echoes James Rahl’s
1942 statement during the initial implementation of the FLSA that:
“[t]o require each employee to sue individually might well congest
court calendars immeasurably and produce long delays in the gaining
of rightful recoveries.”186 Under this longstanding rationale, courts
have traditionally allowed jurisdiction over the defendant regarding
out-of-state plaintiffs if proper in relation to the original plaintiff. 187
Separating collective litigation because of personal jurisdiction
presents disadvantages for plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial
system.188 As suggested above, for individual plaintiffs, the total
lawsuit costs would likely outweigh any personal recovery, making it
virtually impossible for low-income employees to recover lost wages
or overtime.189 For defendants, independent litigation also carries
risks, such as the possibility of facing the same issues in multiple
separate lawsuits with disparate judgments all over the country. 190
Moreover, fracturing litigation into multiple suits will also contribute
to overburdening the court system with duplicative work.191
Alternatively, allowing out-of-state opt-in employees to sue the
same employer in the same court at the same time as in-state

185. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989); Becker & Strauss, supra note
182, at 1323. In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Supreme Court also noted that Rule 23 class
actions are “fundamentally different” from FLSA collective actions. 569 U.S. 66, 74 (2013).
186. James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
37 ILL. L. REV. 119, 123 (1942); Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for
Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 1765, 1785 (2017).
187. Judge Bernice Bouie Donald’s dissent in Canaday forcefully stated that “[i]n the first 79 years
since the enactment of the FLSA, the answer to th[e] question [of whether federal courts have specific
jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs] was simple: ‘Yes.’” Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9
F.4th 392, 404 (6th Cir. 2021) (Donald, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, No. 21-1098 (U.S. Feb. 2,
2022).
188. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2018).
189. Adam N. Steinman, Access to Justice, Rationality, and Personal Jurisdiction, 71 VAND. L. REV.
1401, 1429 (2018); see supra note 187 and accompanying text; Sainz, supra note 3, at 10 (“By denying
courts the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of[-]state corporations with continuous and
systematic contacts with a state simply because they are not incorporated or headquartered there denies
plaintiffs their right to seek redress in a court of law.”).
190. See Dodson, supra note 188, at 3 (“The first successful judgment against a defendant could be
used to establish liability against that defendant in future cases brought by different plaintiffs through the
doctrine of issue preclusion.”).
191. Id. at 3–4.
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employees has numerous advantages.192 Collective actions comprising
all interested employees in a single action, and in which the court has
proper jurisdiction regarding the claims of resident plaintiffs, allows
both plaintiffs and defendants to “pool their resources and share
information to make their litigation efforts more efficient and
effective. The lawsuits can be heard in a single court before a single
judge and jury, saving the judicial system, the witnesses, and the
parties millions of dollars and a great deal of time.”193 These aspects
of collective actions have traditionally been allowed under the FLSA
statute, and they have afforded parties the opportunity to reduce costs,
reach mass resolutions, and ensure compliance with labor laws.194
C. Uniformity and Predictability
Predictability is central to the functioning of the judicial system. 195
Parties and attorneys need clear and predictable rules to develop sound
litigation strategies and make informed decisions.196 A clear rule by
Congress and the Supreme Court stating that specific personal
jurisdiction in collective actions only takes into consideration the
claims of original plaintiffs would benefit all parties. First, ironically,
it would eliminate forum shopping. 197 Second, it is in line with a larger
trend towards the federalization of aggregate litigation.198
1. Forum Shopping
Most states have enacted wage and hour laws through statutes or
through common law.199 Because state wage and hour laws do not have
a default group-action mechanism, such group actions follow “Rule 23
of the [FRCP] or, if filed in state court, the state’s applicable version

192. Id. at 4.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 8.
195. Boris W. Gautier, Reluctance or Apathy? Examining Georgia’s Continuing Adherence to a Strict
Mutuality Issue Preclusion Doctrine, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 591 (2021).
196. Id.
197. See supra Part II.A.3.
198. See infra Part III.C.2.
199. Alexander, supra note 180, at 516.
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of Rule 23.”200 State laws are often more favorable to employees, and
they have the advantage of not containing opt-in restrictions parallel
to § 216.201
Plaintiff-employees can avoid pleading an FLSA claim and instead
rely solely upon state wage claims to circumvent the opt-in
requirement in several ways.202 Plaintiffs can, for example, maintain a
state-law-only suit in federal court by using the Class Action Fairness
Act (CAFA), which permits original jurisdiction over certain state law
claims.203 Alternatively, plaintiffs can plead a single federal
claim—such as overtime or minimum wage violations—in
combination with parallel state law claims using supplemental
jurisdiction.204 In each case, plaintiffs claiming employment violations
under state laws that are parallel to the FLSA can also maintain a Rule
23 opt-out class.205
Moreover, if a plaintiff is unable to litigate FLSA in a collective
action comprising all aggrieved employees, the plaintiff might try to
bring suit to enforce both FLSA and state wage claims in a single
“hybrid” action.206 Since 2000, courts have largely permitted plaintiffs
to litigate these hybrid actions, which include state law claims brought
on an opt-out representative basis through class action provisions as
well as claims under the FLSA’s opt-in collective action procedures. 207
As mentioned above, the FLSA opt-in mechanism makes it harder for

200. Id. at 517.
201. Becker & Strauss, supra note 182, at 1341.
202. Alexander, supra note 180, at 547; see Becker & Strauss, supra note 182, at 1341 (“Precisely
because of the limitations created by [§] 16(b), representatives of aggrieved employees often join claims
under the FLSA with claims under parallel state wage-and-hour laws.”).
203. Alexander, supra note 180, at 547.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 547–48. Maintenance of such suits may go against Congress’s intent. In 1966, when the
modern, more liberal Rule 23 class action took form, § 216(b) regarding FLSA collective actions
remained unchanged. Becker & Strauss, supra note 182, at 1321. The 1966 drafters explicitly stated that
they did not intend to affect § 216(b) when changing Rule 23. Id. at 1321–22.
206. Hoffman & Ward, supra note 176, at 271; Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual
Certification, and Wage Law Enforcement in the Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269,
274 (2008).
207. Hoffman & Ward, supra note 176, at 271. Other scholars argue that “[t]he modern relationship
between the two procedures dates from approximately 1995 to the present—the era of the so-called ‘two
step’ certification process for FLSA collective actions.” Jhaveri-Weeks & Webbert, supra note 62, at 233;
see also Becker & Strauss, supra note 182, at 1341–42.
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plaintiffs to assemble a large collective, and often the suit has low
participation rates compared to Rule 23 class actions. 208 As a result,
this combination of opt-in and opt-out rules in hybrid class actions
produces differing class sizes for FLSA and state law claims.209
Multiple courts agree that the two procedures are compatible, and the
different procedural mechanisms will not confuse potential class and
collective members. 210 Yet some scholars consider that this mixture
between simultaneous opt-in and opt-out actions under Rule 23 and
the FLSA has the potential for creating contradictory classes by
allowing plaintiffs to “cherry-pick” the benefits from both types of
actions.211 Unarguably, the extension of BMS to collective actions is
producing new incentives to use class actions instead of collective
actions to redress wage disputes. Extending personal jurisdiction to
opt-in plaintiffs would create less conflict and competition between
state and federal wage and hour laws.
2. Multidistrict Litigation and Federal Interest
The BMS opinion did not altogether disapprove of national
aggregate litigation.212 In fact, some scholars think that it
“enthusiastically endorsed” one particular form of aggregate process,
namely MDL.213 Under the MDL Act, the fact that the court in which
the cases are consolidated does not itself have specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendant(s) does not matter because, formally,
the transfer is supposed to be temporary. 214 As mentioned earlier,
however, this consolidation is usually permanent because less than
208. Brunsden, supra note 206; see supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text.
209. Brunsden, supra note 206.
210. David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129, 148 (2003).
211. Thomas H. Barnard & Amanda T. Quan, Trying to Kill One Bird with Two Stones: The Use and
Abuse of Class Actions and Collective Actions in Employment Litigation, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
387, 404–05 (2014) (“The interplay between [class and collective actions] has the potential to create
different, and potentially contradictory, classes within one single lawsuit. Plaintiffs attempting to bring
state law wage claims under Rule 23 and collective actions under the FLSA are essentially trying to ‘have
their cake and eat it too.’”).
212. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1254.
213. Id. at 1254, 1256 (“[BMS] is a milestone in the ascendancy of MDL as the centerpiece of
nationwide dispute resolution in the federal courts.”).
214. Id. at 1297.
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three percent of all cases get remanded back to the trial courts. 215 As
scholars have observed, “[f]unctionally, the MDL court is exercising a
kind of nationwide personal jurisdiction” over the defendant.216 These
scholars note that this is consistent with a larger trend towards the
federalization of mass litigation. 217 Extending personal jurisdiction to
out-of-state plaintiffs under the FLSA collective action mechanism is
compatible with this trend towards federalization. 218 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of MDL, using a type of de facto
nationwide jurisdiction in federal courts, supports the argument that
FLSA collective actions can include out-of-state plaintiffs injured by
the same employer.219
D. Actions from Congress and the Supreme Court
Congress and the Supreme Court can easily put an end to the
growing split among the courts by clarifying that personal jurisdiction
extends to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs in FLSA collective
actions. First, Congress can include jurisdictional language in § 216(b)
to authorize nationwide service of process as it has done in other
statutes, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).220 Under ERISA, an action “may be brought in the
district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or
where a defendant resides or may be found, and process may be served
in any other district where a defendant resides or may be found.”221

215. Id. at 1258, 1297; see supra note 72 and accompany text.
216. Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1174
(2018).
217. Bradt & Rave, supra note 3, at 1258.
218. See id. at 1299–1306 (discussing how MDL promotes federalization of state law claims).
219. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
220. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). Examples of statutes granting nationwide service of process are: 15
U.S.C. § 22 (antitrust laws); 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act);
18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (Anti-Terrorism Act). Actions brought under such statutes have nationwide personal
jurisdiction, as well as supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction, over state law claims joined in such
actions. Ichel, supra note 11, at 39; see also Dodson, supra note 188, at 38 (“The broadest grant of personal
jurisdiction to federal courts would be to allow nationwide personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted
by the Constitution over all parties and claims in a multiclaim or multiparty lawsuit.”).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
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Under the FLSA, an action should also be brought in any place where
the defendant conducts any business.222
Second, the Supreme Court can also make clear that the BMS
holding on mass tort actions does not extend to opt-in collective
actions.223 For instance, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have already
declined to extend BMS to class actions.224 When the claims of in-state
plaintiff-employees are jurisdictionally proper, and the employer also
hires out-of-state employees with similar claims, the district courts
should be able to consider all the claims of aggrieved employees at
once. The Supreme Court’s 2021 opinion in Ford confirms its
willingness to make nuanced distinctions when applying personal
jurisdiction tenets to particular cases.225 The Court’s fluid reading of
causation in Ford seems to foreshadow a reasonable, context-specific
basis of judicial review for collective action questions.226 Those who
deny this possibility foreclose a valuable alternative.
CONCLUSION
FLSA collective actions provide important worker protections. 227
After the Supreme Court’s opinion in BMS, trial courts within the same
judicial districts and circuits across the country are struggling to define
the scope of specific personal jurisdiction in collective actions. 228 To

222. Antitrust laws provide:
Any suit, action, or proceeding . . . may be brought not only in the judicial district
whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 22.
223. See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We see no reason why personal
jurisdiction should be treated any differently from subject-matter jurisdiction and venue: the named
representatives must be able to demonstrate either general or specific personal jurisdiction, but the
unnamed class members are not required to do so.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126 (2021).
224. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
225. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021) (“None of our
precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity
and the litigation will do.”).
226. See id. (rejecting Ford’s argument that specific jurisdiction arises only “because of the defendant’s
in-state conduct”).
227. See supra Part I.B.1.
228. See supra Part II.
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protect workers’ rights, promote uniformity and judicial efficiency
across the nation, deter forum shopping, and support federalism, the
Supreme Court, Congress, or both should formulate a clear rule
granting district courts personal jurisdiction over nonresident
employers in FLSA collective actions with respect to the claims of
out-of-state plaintiffs.
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